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Abstract 
The South Caucasus states are known to serve as a transit or energy “bridge” that delivers Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe, 
making the region of vital imperativeness and a point of attraction to all western powers. The issue of geopolitical configura-
tion of forces in the Caucasus region is greatly connected with the trend of foreign powers influencing its processes, events 
happening within its borders and out of their lines, and with the establishment of new exporting pipelines by-passing Russia 
in order to minimize its place and role in the region. The paper sets out to analytically x-ray the influence, impact and position 
geopolitics assumes in matters of oil and gas in the south Caucasia. The paper implores the use of content analysis and review 
of relevant literatures in sum to attempt a comparative analysis of the subject under stud,  imploring variables such as the; 
geostrategic, geo-economic interest of the distinctive leading geopolitical players and examining the attitude  of these players 
in the South Caucasia region in terms of oil and gas.
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Introduction
As a result of natural population growth; mankind’s unsta-
ble needs, economic and technological developments has 
increased the demand for energy. The importance of Oil 
and gas from the early 20th century cannot be overempha-
sized, as it has established to be one of the most important 
economic cum political power, hence the longing and quest 
for it, which incidentally will remain so in the nearest future; 
more than 44 percent of the 75 percent of the increase in 
energy demand, is from China, India, and Brazil, and more 
countries are likely to follow rapidly on this path in future. 
After the collapse of USSR the new geopolitical realities 
have been created especially in the post-soviet space. In 
the beginning of the 1990s several opinionated and 
interethnic conflicts ensued in the post-soviet space; the 
Caucasus region. The Caucasus region is located at the 
crossroads of Europe and Asia, and its strategic geog-
raphical location and substance is mostly determined by 
the fact that important trans-continental communication cor-
ridors lie across it. The intensive competition and clamor for 
a stake in the region grounds on tremendous mineral 
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resources in the Caspian region, particularly its huge oil 
and gas reserves. The South Caucasus states act in the 
role of energy “bridge” to deliver Caspian hydrocarbons to 
Europe. The issue of geopolitical configuration of forces in 
the Caucasus region, is greatly connected with the trend of 
foreign powers influencing in the region, and with the 
establishment of new exporting pipelines by-passing 
Russia in order to minimize its place and role in the region.
South Caucasus Region
The South Caucasus has become a new strategic frontier 
for Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy 
security, unresolved conflicts, trade links, migration, and key 
policy areas. Prospects for the South Caucasus in the 21st 
century will be shaped by the interaction between major 
external actors, the ambitions of states and peoples in the 
region, and the region’s role as a crossroads of hydrocar-
bon routes. Regional tensions, natural resources and geo-
political rivalries make the Black Sea Region a strategic but 
sensitive area. In the absence of cooperative structures able 
to contain conflict, security threats ranging from interstate 
conflicts to illegal trafficking have emerged. At the end of the 
Cold War, the states around the Black Sea regained their 
sovereignty. This historical event not only marked the start 
of a move towards independence, democracy and market 
economy, but also unleashed hitherto suppressed ethnic, 
national and territorial conflicts, and even terrorism. Analysis 
of the US presence in the South Caucasus region demon-
strates concern of the country not only with the issue of 
energy safety and possibility of energy being transited 
through it, but the regions ability to maintain the status of 
being an influential player in all key geographic points of 
the planet, including the Black Sea.
Existing and Prospective Projects
At the moment, the region is pre-occupied with extending 
and expanding its energy carriers supply ways, new ex-
porting pipelines are being constructed. In other words, 
effort is in place to establish more pipelines. And this was 
informed by the recent struggle of the Caucasus states for 
the control over the ways of delivery of hydrocarbons to 
foreign energy markets which has intensified significantly. 
The Baku-Supsa pipeline is one of many such projects that 
have sprung up in the region since the fall of Communism, 
when the massive natural resources of the Caspian region 
were opened to foreign investment for the first time. The 
proposed western route, a refurbished Soviet-era line, 
passing through Russia has faced opposition and anta-
gonism from Turkey because it requires tankers for cros-
sing the Black Sea, which are forced to transit the Bos-
phorus. Turkey sees this as a potential ecological hazard. 
This was a significant threat because Turkey is in control of 
the only route from Georgia to the west. Therefore, the 
pipeline was designed to go through Turkish straits for 
shipping to global markets.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipelines construction 
will have major implications for the South Caucasus, espe-
cially as regards its role in European and World Politics. For 
everyone involved, within as well as in every direction from 
the South Caucasus, the building of the BTC pipeline recon-
figures the mental map with which political observers and 
decision-makers look at the world. Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia will see their futures in more direct relation to Europe 
through the umbilical cord that BTC constitutes.
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline (also known as: 
South Caucasus Pipeline) is improving the gas supply of 
Georgia and Turkey. These two countries which are mostly 
reliant on the imported gas from Russia and particularly from 
Iran will have an opportunity to receive alternative source 
of gas. Besides, it will create the convenient base for the 
further transportation of gas toward the other states of the 
Black Sea region. (Chitadze, 2009)
The Nabucco-West pipeline (also referred to as the Tur-
key–Austria gas pipeline) is conceived as an alternative gas 
carrier to South Stream that would be delivering Caspian 
gas to the European Union along a route bypassing 
Russia’s territory and thereby impeding its influence. Many 
in the political and economic quarters of the EU were 
saying outright that Nabucco’s main aim was to reduce the 
share of gas supplies from Russia. However, no funda-
mental progress in implementing the project has been 
achieved yet. Generally speaking, Nabucco is not so much 
an economic project as a political one. The European 
Commission had hoped to use it to ease the influence of 
Russia as the main source of fuel for Europe. The Trans-
Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) is a proposed natural gas 
pipeline from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe. TANAP 
to reach the European market in terms of the independent 
Azerbaijani gas from Russia is of paramount importance. 
Natural resources have created the desire to have reliable 
means of transportation of Azerbaijan repeatedly brought to 
the West. For this reason, TANAP Baku offers new oppor-
tunities for the diversification of energy policies. From the 
perspective of Turkey, however, this project cannot meet all 
the needs of the project of natural gas. South Stream is 
seen as a rival to the projected Nabucco pipeline. Some 
experts claim that the South Stream pipeline is a political 
project to counter Nabucco and to expand Russian pre-
sence in the region. South Stream is of considerable poli-
tical importance. As it will undermine the monopoly position 
of Ukraine as a transit country for gas supplies and ensure 
that Europe continues to receive a large proportion of its 
gas from Russia.
Geopolitical Interest of Main Players
There are three groups of basic interests, represented in the 
region of today;
1. US and major continental European countries
2. Post Soviet Russia, Turkey and Iran
3. Black Sea countries
Due to the convenient geopolitical location, the South 
Caucasia region is one of the most important locations in the 
world and plays an extremely important role in the modern 
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global security affairs.
United States of America
For the US the South Caucasia is a strategic corridor, serv-
ing three basic and interrelated strategic purposes; first, 
the region connects Europe with Central Asia through the 
Caucasus, with Central Asia being the focus, the seat of the 
geo-strategic balance between China and the West for the 
21st century. Second, the region represents a gateway to 
the larger Middle East. The opportunity to shape and control 
the agenda of the Black Sea and the Caucasus provides the 
US with the potential to fully integrate both regional powers 
– Russia and Turkey – into the Western Alliance. Third, the
region is an important commercial route and energy 
corridor, which could provide Europe with alternative oil 
and gas resources. The U.S. has a significant interest in 
expanding oil and gas pipelines networks to bolster com-
petition, diversify suppliers, and facilitate the production of 
energy to deal with surging global demand. It is concerned 
about Russian assertiveness in gas markets, including its 
use of gas as a political instrument, and is keenly aware of 
Turkey’s own strategic role and growing stake in Me-
diterranean-Black-Sea-Caspian energy networks.
European Union
The EU has increasingly become a geopolitical player in 
the region, with growing abilities to protect its interests in its 
South-Eastern neighborhood. EU policies toward the 
regional states have included some strategies: enlar-
gement with Romania and Bulgaria with prospects for the 
eventual inclusion of Turkey, the EU’s strategic partnership 
with Russia, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
including Ukraine, Moldova and the three South Caucasian 
states. The specific areas examined are energy diver-
sification and conflict resolution. So far, energy diver-
sification is the field where the EU has most clearly realized 
this conflict of interest, while it has been reluctant to 
challenge Russian interests regarding the unresolved 
conflicts, Transnistria being a partial exception. (Star, 
Cornell, 2005) These are key areas of EU involvement, 
which are also closely tied to the EU’s abilities of pursuing 
its deeper objectives in the region, regarding the de-
velopment of a stable, secure, and democratic European 
neighbor.
Europe’s future growth in gas supplies is likely to be met 
not mainly by growing Russian gas production but by gas 
supplies from the energy-rich states of the Caspian region: 
primarily Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In re-
cent history, the export of Caspian oil and gas to the EU 
would have seemed utopian. Yet important developments 
since have made this prospect utterly realistic. This is in 
great part due to the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline. This pipeline effectively connects the West Cas-
pian shore with European markets, providing top-of-the line 
infrastructure for oil and a parallel gas pipeline. This also 
makes the prospect of East Caspian resources reaching 
Europe more realistic than ever, as the infrastructure is 
now in use just across the Caspian.
Russia
24 years have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union, but, 
as any British national will tell you, this is too short a time 
for the mentality of the ruling elite to adjust to a post-
imperial way of looking at the world. Russia’s global 
strategic framework is reflected into two basic strategic 
dimensions: passive dimension of resistance, and active 
dimension of powerful geopolitical return through the 
policies of energy. The South Caucasia has the value of a 
strategic corridor, connecting Europe to the Caucasus, to 
the Caspian and to Central Asia, the most important thing 
is to cork, to plug up this corridor, to turn it into a dead end, 
an impasse for the Western security and developmental 
infrastructure. Jeopardizing politically Ukraine’s and Ge-
orgia’s application for NATO membership is one possible 
instrument to pursue this aim. Causing and maintaining low 
intensity conflicts in the “bottlenecks” of the Black Sea 
region – like the South Caucasus - is another instrument, 
used by Russia. The ethno-communal contests effectively 
fragment the fragile national structures of post-Soviet 
republics, putting into jeopardy the key prerequisite for 
those countries to join the Western Alliance – institutional 
stability, transparency and rule of law. (Socor V., 2006) 
Russia has had a clear and discernible policy regarding 
energy resources as relates to both Europe and the wider 
region. This policy has consisted of a number of facets, all 
of which have sought to capitalize on energy as the main 
vehicle for strengthening Russia’s influence over its 
neighboring regions. The strategy has had several main 
aspects: state control over the production of gas for export; 
keeping a monopoly on acquiring Central Asian gas at 
cheap prices; achieving increasing dominance over the 
European consumer markets; and utilizing dominance over 
both the import from and export to CIS countries (Common 
wealth of Independent States) of gas for political purposes. 
Moscow is increasingly capitalizing on energy – and 
particularly the less fungible commodity that is natural gas 
– as a tool to boost its influence and might vis-à-vis Europe.
The picture is clear: Moscow is aiming to dominate Eurasian 
energy, and has repeatedly shown its readiness to use this 
domination for political purposes. Political use of energy has 
been blatant in regard to former Soviet states, including EU 
members.
Turkey
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey became the 
largest littoral state on the Black Sea. There are series and 
sequences of challenges and conflicts being anticipated to 
be faced, with no immediate or easy solution in sight. Turkey 
possess huge mineral deposits and a very advantageous 
geography, because Turkey’s neighbors, the Middle Eastern 
countries, Europe, Russia and the Central Asian republics 
have nearly 73 percent of global oil and natural gas reserves; 
therefore, for the Turkish policymakers Turkey is a natural 
energy hub, an energy bridge between energy consuming 
countries of Europe and energy producing countries of Mid-
dle East, Russia and Central Asia and it also portends the 
quality of ensuring energy security through diversification 
of routes. Based upon the Turkey’s needs and geostrategic 
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position, fundamental priorities of the Turkey’s energy policy 
are to secure, stabilize and diversify energy transportation 
routes. In favor of that mentality, the Turkish policymakers 
have given priority to long-distance, cross-border energy 
pipelines that will assure the energy security for both Tur-
key and energy consuming countries of the Western world. 
Meanwhile, its energy strategy is to complete the East-
West energy corridor and thus it aims to transport energy 
resources in the Caspian Sea to the Western countries, 
bypassing the Russian route. Turkey had planned to be-
come a new, important and effective actor in the world 
energy sector, and by completion of the international pro-
jects, nearly 6 to 7 percent of global oil supply has been 
transiting through the Turkish territory from as far back as 
2012 and thus naturally Ceyhan city has become a major 
energy hub and oil outlet terminal in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is the most important country in the region es-
pecially for Russia, whose position in the entire Caucasus 
largely depends on its influence in this particular state. This 
is due to the strategic location of Azerbaijan at the intersec-
tion between Southern Caucasus (the border with Georgia 
and Armenia), Central Asia (the maritime border with Ka-
zakhstan and Turkmenistan) and the Middle East (the bor-
der with Iran). Azerbaijan is also the largest and most popu-
lous country in the region and has large oil and natural gas 
reserves, especially on the Caspian shelf. Other important 
aspects that is of importance to Russia’s security interest 
include Azerbaijan’s close border tie with the unstable Rus-
sian Northern Caucasus, and Baku s close co-operation with 
Washington, Ankara and NATO, which Russia perceives as 
a threat. In relation to Azerbaijan, Russia has much fewer 
instruments of influence than with Georgia, a country with no 
energy resource of its own. The policy of Russia during the 
Karabakh conflict is a serious problem in its relations with 
Azerbaijan. Freezing the conflict, i.e. making sure that the 
quasi-independent state of Karabakh Armenians continues 
to exist and that the Armenians separatist community con-
tinues to occupy Azerbaijan accounting for about 15-16 % of 
the country’s territory is in the interest of Russia as it enables 
it to exert influence on both Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
Azerbaijan, as a natural gas and oil supplier as well as 
a developing country, has handled the issue of energy in 
terms of its implications for Azerbaijan’s economic growth 
and security with keen interest. However, the consideration 
of Azerbaijan alone is albeit insufficient in explaining the phe-
nomenon of energy security within the context of Azerbaijan, 
in that the wider Caspian Sea region, in the post-Cold War 
era, has become highly crucial for the global energy regime.
Georgia
After the short period of “strategic idealism”  that charac-
terized the early days of independent, Georgia began to 
develop and increasingly realistic foreign policy, which has 
been less motivated by the fear of Russia and not solely 
driven by the short term survival agenda. 
Georgia is following a pro-Western course, aiming to enter 
Western institutions and has a clear intention to join NATO 
and the EU. When looking at Georgian energy security, the 
question could be raised whether the country has put its 
stakes too high. Explosions in Russia’s North Caucasus 
region, which cut off Georgian energy supplies in January 
2006, clearly demonstrated the country’s dependence on 
Russian energy supplies. Already having doubled the price 
of gas, Russian consequences in the case of a Georgian 
withdrawal from the CIS could have proven most severe. 
In addition to energy dependence, Russia was Geor-
gia’s largest trading partner in 2005. However, the re-routing 
of energy supplies from Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey, 
makes it clear that Georgia is trying to reduce future energy 
dependence on Russia. Moreover, Georgia has recently 
become a main energy transport corridor for Europe be-
cause of the BTC oil-pipeline and the BTE gas-pipeline. 
Thus, the transit fees for energy transports paid to Georgia 
are a potentially substantial asset to the nation’s economy.
Armenia
As a consequence of the disintegration of the USSR, Arme-
nia gained independence in the early nineties. This 
young republic was heavily burdened by the war over 
Nagorno-Karabakh in neighboring Azerbaijan, which 
started in 1989. The important factor that limited its 
development was the blockades with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Armenia is showing structural 
economic growth through Western and Russian economic 
support. The Armenian Diaspora, which according to 
some sources consists of 10 million people, constitutes a 
source of powerful support for Armenia’s interests and 
provides for considerable financial support. Armenia 
maintains strong military and economic ties with Russia 
and is considered to be Russia’s last loyal ally in the South-
Caucasus. On the other hand Armenia’s willingness to 
implement economic and democratic reforms has resulted 
in considerable development assistance from the West.   
Armenia is Russia’s only loyal ally in the South 
Caucasus. By announcing the year 2006 as ‘the year of 
Russia’, Armenia has demonstrated that it attaches great 
value to its relationship with Moscow. Nevertheless 
relations have suffered some pressure as of late when 
Russia’s natural gas producing firm Gazprom announced 
prices would be raised.  This has led to severe criticism 
from the side of the opposition in Armenia. As the country is 
totally dependent on energy from Russia, there have been 
calls for investigating alternative energy sources to 
minimize dependence on Russian gas. (Chatlamadzhyan, 
2005)
Conclusion
Conclusively therefore, it can be said that the South Cau-
casia region stands out as one of the most attractive 
geographical locations in the world, and reasons for this 
could be advanced thus;
i) Huge Energy and Mineral deposits
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ii) Rivalry main geopolitical players such as United
States of America, Europe, Russia, Turkey and Iran and 
there are several sources of conflicts in this region.
The region is increasingly becoming a critical strategic 
crossroads in 21st century geopolitics.  It links Europe with 
the energy rich countries in the Caspian region, and as a 
result it is a nexus of multiple oil and gas pipelines and pipe-
line projects.  If the EU is serious about the diversification 
of its energy supplies and improving its long term (beyond 
2025) energy security, the region must become a priority 
for the EU, because its oil and especially gas options will 
heavily depend on it. Furthermore, development and pro-
motional cooperation in the region is limited at bilateral and 
trilateral level instead of being advanced to multilateral 
levels, whereby countries of the world could be involved in 
the developmental project of the region. Hence, it faces 
certain limitations in terms of harnessing cooperation and 
assistance from other parts of the world. 
In furtherance to the above, the following key areas 
must be addressed succinctly, and they inter alia;
i) Western countries especially US, EU and Turkey
should have an increased interest in the Black Sea Caspian 
region in terms of energy security and will be able to provide 
energy security and decrease to dependence of import oil 
and gas from the Russia Federation and Middle East. 
ii) South Caucasia countries should determinate posi-
tion related to the energy security. 
iii) The primary responsibility for articulating rational vi-
sion of what the Black Sea region should look like ten years 
from now it is significant to mention that clarify implementa-
tion existed projects and  at the same time consideration of 
prospective projects. 
iv) The Black Sea region countries displays a high de-
gree of diversity in terms of the size and physical power of 
the countries involved, levels of socio-economic develop-
ment, systems of governance, maturity of democratic insti-
tutions, business culture and financial structures, and hu-
man development indicators. We can say that the individual 
economic performance of most of the Black Sea countries 
except Armenia, over the past decade was impressive.
v) The stability of the wider region will depend very much
on cooperation energy, we may understand the urgent need 
for an Energy Security Strategy in the Black Sea region.
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